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ABSTRACT
Among a wide range of challenges, EU member states have been facing a 
growing threat from terrorism in the recent years. The primary responsi-
bility for combating terrorism lies with each individual member state, 
although the threat is becoming increasingly cross-border and diverse. 
Regardless of whether terrorism poses a real or perceived threat to the 
states’ and citizens’ security, public opinion is one important force behind 
the extensive counterterrorism efforts undertaken in Europe. In this arti-
cle, we explore the influence of public opinion on EU policy within the 
security domain in the period 2005–19. We investigate the relationship 
between the number of attacks carried out on EU territory and citizens’ 
increased concern for terrorist attacks, as well as the attention given to 
this topic by EU decision-makers. Based on data from Eurobarometer, the 
Global Terrorism Database, and evidence from official documents, we 
perform an analysis of the connection between public perception and 
anti-terrorism policy coordination in the EU. The results of this investiga-
tion point to increasing levels of collective securitization and an ever- 
stronger focus on security and counterterrorism in the European Union. 
Our findings are related to policy formation in the EU.
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Security; terror attacks; 
threat perception; policy 
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Introduction
Terrorism has become an increasingly important subject for European citizens over the last 15 years. 
Although intergovernmental cooperation to fight terrorism started as early as the 1970s (e.g. TREVI), 
EU-level policy-making in the domain of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and especially in the field of 
anti-terrorism, has seen an increase since 2004. This article contributes to the scholarship on the 
political and bureaucratic dimensions of EU multi-level decision-making in a domain of core-state 
powers. We investigate the covariation between terror attacks within EU-countries, citizens’ percep-
tion of terror, and JHA Council resolutions with explicit reference to terrorism.
There are recent tendencies of enhanced collective securitization and more integration of 
a European terror-prevention policy framework, that is more tightly coordinated at the EU-level. 
Already in 2004, in reaction to the Madrid train attacks, EU leaders had agreed to establish a Counter- 
terrorism Coordinator. The dreadful attacks in France, 2015, arguably prompted the EU Passenger 
Names Record (PNR) directive of 2016. And, in the same year, Europol created the European Counter 
Terrorism Centre as a response to the EU’s urgent operational coordination needs. By discussing the 
key factors and the drivers of the policy-making process, we study the influence of the perceived 
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threat of terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2018. More precisely, we look at the extent to which the 
political and societal repercussions of this perceived security crisis have affected policy making in the 
EU. We argue that the perception of terrorist threats and subsequently the politicization of terrorism 
in Europe creates pressure for the creation of EU-level initiatives on the issue of terrorism. The 
hypothesis is, thus, that the occurrence of terrorist attacks positively impacts the threat perception of 
citizens, which in turn is directly correlated with politicization of terrorism, i.e. attention paid to the 
issue by political elites at the European level.”
In a generic definition, politicization combines three elements: increased issue salience, 
a polarization of opinions, and the expansion of actors and audiences (De Wilde, Leupold, and 
Schmidtke 2016). The contestation by citizens affects policy debates in the EU and member states 
and focuses the policy response on a narrow range of issues perceived to be at the heart of the 
problem. In the EU-JHA context, the heightened perception of threats to Europe may have con-
tributed to increasing politicization and in strong pressure to elevate the policy framework’s security 
objectives, especially counterterrorism and border control, above other cooperation priorities.
Despite a new ‘integration demarcation’ and the current tendency towards re-nationalization, the 
EU system of multi-level governance is generally seen as the world’s most advanced system of power 
transfer via supranational delegation (Henökl 2014a; Kriesi 2016; Schimmelfennig 2014). Therefore, 
an insight into preference-formation, goal-definition and strategy-design in the EU’s tightly inter-
woven governance network, coupling national and EU administrations together, may be particularly 
telling and can be seen as a case of transnational public administration. Our ambition is to 
investigate if there is an increase in JHA resolutions with explicit mention to terrorism in the period 
hallmarked by increased public attention to this topic.
This article is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline the theoretical argument 
derived from the existing literature on EU multi-level governance and terrorism studies respectively. 
We then present the data and method before entering into a discussion of findings and drawing 
conclusions in support of our argument. The analysis produced evidence of a strong correlation 
between precipitating events, public opinion and political salience, contributing to a push for 
collective securitization and the gradual integration of security governance in the EU.
The theoretical argument
We combine two frameworks explaining institutional change within the European Union at different 
levels. At the meta-level, we employ the toolkit advanced by scholars focusing on core state powers 
(Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014) in order to investigate whether, and if so, how EU institutions 
extend their sphere of competence to executive powers, notably different areas of security admin-
istration (border management, law-enforcement and judicial cooperation, intelligence and anti- 
terrorism activities – in short, policing).
In the growing literature on EU counterterrorism cooperation, some authors have criticized the 
EU, for example Bures (2010, 2011), arguing that many of the counterterrorism instruments lack 
a proper implementation at the state-level, and that they lack effectiveness. Others (e.g. Argomaniz, 
Bures, and Kaunert 2015, 2017; Cross 2017; Monar 2007, 2015) paint a more positive picture of the EU 
as an actor that has accomplished a lot following the major attacks in Madrid and London, especially 
in the development of bureaucratic bodies and the coordination of the competent national autho-
rities of the member states. The building of capacities at the EU-level has clearly increased the EU’s 
presence in the counter-terrorism realm, defined as ‘the materialization and development of EU 
policies and their translation into national systems and the establishment of institutional actors with 
the necessary powers and resources to fulfil the objectives laid out in the official EU strategy 
documents’ (Argomaniz, Bures, and Kaunert 2015, 195). More recently, state-of-the-art scholarship 
on EU security governance detects considerable ‘supranational entrepreneurship’ from institutions 
at the European level and underlines the growing importance of this policy field in Europe (Kaunert 
2018).
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When it comes to understanding as to how this capacity building at the EU-level and the 
concomitant competence-upload are actually happening, we draw on the theories of multi-level 
governance and multi-level administration (Eberlein and Grande 2005; Egeberg and Trondal 2017; 
Piattoni 2014; Zürn 2010). The more the EU becomes involved in not only policy development but 
also policy coordination and implementation, the more important become issues of administrative 
interaction between the involved administrative levels. This article contributes insights from admin-
istrative decision-making theory and organizational analysis to the field of antiterrorism, pointing to 
politicization as the main connection between them, in order to explain the mechanisms of EU-level 
governance. In doing so, the article fills a gap in research on European security studies.
Lacking an administrative basis to implement supranational policies, the EU has long been 
dependent on member states’ administration (Bauer and Becker 2014). Under the pressure of 
contestation and political mobilization due to terror, the EU has recently built considerable capacity 
in the realm of JHA and counterterrorism measures, traditionally a core-area of state-power. Taking 
this situation into account, the EU administrative system has been portrayed as a multi-level and 
‘nested’ or ‘network administration’ (Egeberg 2006) where institutions at different levels of govern-
ment ‘are linked together in the performance of tasks’ (Hofmann and Türk 2006, 583; Henökl 2014b). 
Administrative capacity-building at the EU-level has repeatedly become a point of contention along 
the ‘cosmopolitan-nationalist’ cleavage line (Grande and Kriesi 2015, 191). Since the end of the 
‘permissive consensus’ in the aftermath of the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, such competence-upload 
has been regarded as a challenge to administrative autonomy and sovereignty of member state 
governments, particularly in areas of core-state powers, such as security policy (e.g. Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs 2014; Henökl and Trondal 2015).
Further, we explain how policy change, aiming at reform and coordination at the EU-level to 
achieve higher degrees of interoperability, information exchange and more tightly coupled coopera-
tion between services is actually taking place. In order to do so, our point of departure is the 
supposition taken from organization theory that links between and within levels of government 
also affect policy-making practice and governance patterns; this is particularly important where 
these practices and patterns reflect executive strategizing in a way of readjusting, reforming and 
restructuring bureaucratic rank and file, (re-)directing resources (attention, time, personnel, expertise 
and budgets) to allow for policy coherence and efficacy. As a consequence, these developments 
have a measurable influence on decision-making behaviour (Christensen and Lægreid 2011; Henökl 
2015; March and Olsen 1995). Concerns and considerations may change in their relative levels of 
priority, importance and context. Communication is key: who do relevant policy makers talk to? From 
whom do they receive advice? Who are these elites and what is their power? What catches their 
attention? Who do they really listen to?
Quite obviously, the point of the matter is political salience. How do decision-makers anticipate the 
people’s verdict on their performance on issues that the public thinks are vital? This phenomenon 
finds expression in efforts of collective securitization, frequently caused by ‘a single precipitating event 
or a set of cascading events of gravity sufficient to disrupt [the] status quo and prompt a perception 
by the securitising actor (and its audience) that the qualitative character of the internal or external 
security environment has worsened’ (Kaunert and Léonard 2019; Sperling and Webber 2019). The 
perception of transnational threats such as terror triggers a reflex of collective securitization, and in 
the European case frequently and increasingly so to the establishment of joint EU security governance 
structures (Sperling and Webber 2019; Wæver 2011). Argomaniz, Bures, and Kaunert (2015, 197) 
qualify EU-policy formulation aiming at counter radicalization as ‘incident driven, a direct – and 
sometimes inconsistent – reaction to the bombings in Madrid and London’ (see also Bakker 2015).
On the relationship between terrorism and public opinion, most studies show that when the 
public fears acts of terror, voters tend to turn to support more right-wing parties, more hawkish 
politics, and stronger leaders (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Hersh 2013). This 
strand of literature also includes Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) study which finds that in the 
context of terrorist threat, voters stray from their long-term political predisposition, and instead 
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tend to favour strong leaders. In other words, the causal chain proposed is that terrorist attacks 
would, through the pressure of the electorate, lead to a rise of politicization and salience of this issue 
with both citizens and politicians, forcing the latter to take targeted policy action. As for the 
politicization of external policies, the main focus has been on a general rise in importance of security 
concerns (Costa 2018; Schmidt 2019).
Terrorism differs from crime in that it is designed to harm random victims and to instil general 
fear in an entire population, a process in which media reporting plays an important part 
(Williamson, Fay, and Miles-Johnson 2019). Evidence from Israel show that persons in areas with 
more exposure to terrorist attacks have greater fear than those residing in less exposed areas 
(Shechory-Bitton and Cohen-Louck 2018), while Todd, Wilson, and Casey (2005) demonstrate that 
previous experience of terrorist attacks also have a national impact. To sum up, terrorist attacks 
would be expected to have most effect locally, then nationally, and to a lesser degree (but still 
present) in other countries.
In the EU multi-level system, efforts to design coherent responses to complex or ‘wicked’ 
policy problems present a three-dimensional coordination challenge: 1) horizontal (among 
actors at the same level, such as line ministries or Commission Directorate-Generals); 2) vertical, 
(cross-cutting policy sectors spanning various governance levels); and 3) the need to develop 
an outward orientation to meet ‘real-world’ needs. Such ‘contingent coordination’ confronts 
bureaucracies with the demand to adapt to evolving problems, thus requiring a high degree of 
flexibility to ‘utilize existing capacity in an unpredictable and complex situation’, as in the case 
of political turbulence and heightened crisis perception (Ansell, Sørensen, and Torfing 2017; 
Bulmer and Joseph 2016; Head and Alford 2015; Kettl 2003, 256). Crises may represent ‘critical 
junctures’ in the evolution of institutions because system-changing decisions need to be taken 
(Cappoccia and Kelemen 2007; Gourevitch 1986). Moreover, in times of crisis, administrative 
decision-making tends to become more centralized since the most senior decision-makers take 
it upon themselves to deal with the threats that have led to the crisis (Dahlström, Peters, and 
Pierre 2011; t’Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin 1993). Because ‘an urgent response is required in 
an uncertain situation threatening fundamental values or life-sustaining systems’, the crisis 
facilitates the reallocation of decision-making power to the executive and centralizes the 
direction of political attention and the allocation of resources (Ansell, Sørensen, and Torfing 
2017, 2).
In brief, the article promotes the following argument: Triggered by a series of precipitating 
events, labelled as (Islamist) terror attacks, decision-makers anticipate the mobilizing power of 
fear and invest their efforts and political capital into the elaboration of security-related policy. The 
mobilization of public opinion is fuelled by increased media attention on the salient topics of 
safety and control. In response, politicians and bureaucrats across state boundaries and govern-
mental levels engage in a plethora of direct and indirect authoritative measures (legal as well as 
non-legislative action, commitments to coordination and cooperation, exchange of information, 
prioritization, acts of reform, etc.). The European security governance space is multifaceted and 
has been shaped over several decades, and our focus is on whether the recent acts of terrorism 
and citizen perception is associated with increased politicization and counter terrorism activity at 
the EU level (Bakker 2015). However, at the same time we stress that there are multiple causes of 
EU policy action, which include the direct response to terrorist threat as well as policy entrepre-
neurship (in which attacks as well as public opinion can create a window of opportunity). There 
are, of course, caveats with our analysis, as our data will show correlations between terrorist 
attacks, perceptions, and mentions of terrorism in Council resolutions. EU policy making is 
complex including several transmission mechanisms in a union of relatively heterogeneous 
states.
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Data and method
We investigate data on perceptions and terrorism for all 28 EU countries together with empirical 
material as to the initiatives taken at EU-level to address this perceived threat of terrorism and 
prevent attacks on the European mainland. This is done in order to: a) present the development over 
time of perceptions of terrorism and actual impact of such high-impact adverse events on public 
opinion and policy making as well as the connection between these; and b) go beyond investigating 
the relationship between perceptions of terrorism and actual EU policy, this paper offers an updated 
cartography of an emerging EU security governance space, spanning authorities and competences 
from across member states and inter- and intra-administrative hierarchies and networks.
Data on perceptions of terrorism are gathered from the Eurobarometer (European Commission 
2020). This includes annual data from the 28 EU member states for the period 2005–2019 which 
shows the percentage in each country who think that terrorism is one of the two most important 
issues currently facing their country. The overall numbers for the EU countries are presented in 
Figure 1. In parallel, we examine proposals and measures launched in official documents and 
working papers such as Council Conclusions, Commission initiatives, and motions by the European 
Parliament, aiming at both establishing new structures or connecting existing authorities in the 
perspective of creating an integrated security governance space in Europe. Combining the rich and 
thus far unexploited quantitative empirical material on terror attacks with citizens’ perceptions of 
threat and crisis together with the qualitative data on EU action in the field of JHA we show that crisis 
perception created a sense of urgency at the various governance levels involved in formulating EU 
anti-terror strategies. The amount of mentions in Council resolutions is not a direct counter terrorism 
policy measure, but it provides us with measure of the degree of awareness of the topic with the 
policy makers.
We employ regression models to help determine whether the effect of fatalities and incidents on 
perceptions are robust when including other explanatory variables. Further, we present random 
effect models rather than fixed effects. The reason for this is that some EU countries fortunately have 
not experienced fatalities or incidents during the period in question and would as such be left out of 
a fixed effects model. In a random effects model, they are included but contribute only through the 
Figure 1. Graph of standardized variables perception of terror and fatalities.
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between effects estimator of the RE model (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). The control variables 
are all gathered from the World Bank (2019). These include per capita GDP (in thousands), GDP 
growth (in percentage), population (log transformed), and unemployment (percentage). All the 
explanatory variables are lagged 1 year. We present one model with fatalities alone together with 
the above-mentioned control variables (Model 1 in Table 1), and one where we add incidents to the 
same model (Model 2). The equations for the two models are presented below: 
yit ¼ β0RE þ β1REx1it þ β2REx2it þ β3REx3it þ β4REx4it þ β5REx5it þ vi þ eit ½1�
yit ¼ β0RE þ β1REx1it þ β2REx2it þ β3REx3it þ β4REx4it þ β5REx5it ½2�
þ β6REx6it þ vi þ eit 
Our analysis covers all 28 EU countries and a total of 343 observations in the period 2005–2019 for 
the dependent variable, and period 2004–2018 for the independent variables.1 In Table 2 we present 
the correlation between perception of terror and number of incidents, number of fatalities, and both 
incidents and fatalities lagged one year. We see that the highest correlation is between perceptions 
and last year’s number of fatalities. The standard errors in both models are clustered by country. As 
we are examining the entire population of all EU member states and not just a sample, we are 
generalizing within stochastic model theory rather than within sample theory. The generalization is 
from the observations present in the process or mechanism that brings about the actual data (Gold 
1969; Henkel 1976). Our starting point is a nondeterministic experiment which implies that the 
results of the experiment will vary, even if we try to keep the conditions surrounding it constant. 
Table 1. RE model of the determinants of perceptions of terrorism, 2005–2019.





Number of incidents – 0.045*** 
(0.016)




















Overall R2 0.313 0.345
Groups 28 28
N 343 343
Note: *p < .10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Population 
is log transformed. The observations are clustered using Huber-White robust standard errors 
(White 1980).
Table 2. Correlation matrix of perceptions of 







6 T. HENÖKL AND T. G. JAKOBSEN
Thus, the use of confidence intervals and significance levels makes sense, even if we are investigating 
the entire population. A lack of statistical significance indicates that the association produced by 
nature is no more probable than that produced by chance (Gold 1969; Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 
2017).
Discussion of the findings
In this section, we present our findings and analyse them in the light of the theoretical framework 
based on the methodological approach outlined above. In Table 3 we see that there has been an 
increase of terror attacks resulting in more than 10 civilian deaths in the period 2015–2017. France 
stands out as that country which experienced most and deadliest terror attacks, including the 
Bataclan shooting and the Nice truck attack – two events that spurred the decision on the EU 
Passenger Names Record (PNR) directive of 2016, to collect potentially valuable travel-data for the 
fight against terrorism. We have chosen to focus on deaths rather in addition to the actual number of 
attacks as the former is likely to receive more widespread media attention then the latter, thus 
increasing the likelihood of having a more profound impact on citizens’ perceptions.
Then, we turn to our first argument: with the terror attacks, we see a mobilization of citizen’s 
awareness of terrorism as an important issue facing their country. Figure 1 shows the standardized 
variables of percentage of citizens believing that terrorism is one of the two most important issues 
currently facing their country, as well as the number of fatalities from terror attacks in the European 
Union. The data on the former variable was collected by Eurostat (European Commission 2020)) and 
the latter by the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) 2019). The general trend of increased perception of threat to radical- 
islamist terror, especially from 2014/2015 to 2017, is prevalent in the larger EU countries such as 
Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom as well as many smaller countries. From Figure 1 we 
can observe that for most years two surveys have been conducted by Eurobarometer. There is no 
data for 2011, and there are three recordings for 2014.2
Own compilation 2020.
To account for a time lap between fact and figure, we gathered hardball information on the year 
prior to the measurement of perceptions since it is reasonable to assume that a terror attack in the 
previous year will influence people’s fear of terrorism at a point of time 1 year later.
Table 3. RE model of the determinants of perceptions of terrorism, 
2005–2019.





Number of incidents – 0.045*** 
(0.016)




















Overall R2 0.313 0.345
Groups 28 28
N 343 343
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES 7
In Figure 1 we have juxtaposed fatalities and perceptions on terrorism, we observe a pattern. The 
fear of terrorism is high in 2005–2008, relatively low in the years 2009–2014, before risings sharply 
reaching its highest level in 2017, and then dropping. The trend in Figure 1 is affected by the major 
terrorist attacks, starting with the Madrid train bombings in 2004 followed by the London bombings 
in 2005. The period 2006–2014 was one of relatively few terror-related deaths within the European 
Union.
In Figure 2 we present the number of terrorist incidents recorded. According to the Global 
Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) 2019), an incident is the recording of the use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor 
where the objective has been to reach a political, economic, religious or social goal through coercion. 
Thus, the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. We see from the graph that there 
is an increasing trend of terrorist incidents over time in Europe, but the pattern is not as similar to 
citizens’ perceptions as that of the number of terrorist-related fatalities.
The relationship between terror attacks and citizen perception
In this part of the empirical discussion, we test the relationship between terror attacks (both number 
of attacks and fatalities) on citizens’ fear of terrorism. Here, we have chosen to collapse the data on 
perceptions into yearly observations. First, we present the correlations between perception and 
number of incidents as well as fatalities, both recorded the same year as perception and lagged 
(1 year). We see that the correlation is strongest between perception and fatalities, where the highest 
value by far (Pearson’s coefficient of 0.439) occurs for fatalities lagged 1 year.
It is not surprising that incidents such as the Madrid train bombings influence people’s percep-
tions both instantly and the following year, and that the public’s fear of terrorism is lower in those 
Figure 2. Absolute number of terrorist incidents in the European Union.
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years where there are fewer fatalities. As noted, other factors also influence public opinion, with 
economic issues constantly at the top of citizens’ concerns (Sperling and Webber 2019). The most 
important issues over the last decade has been economic issues, immigration, and health, yet 
terrorism has also risen as a matter of concern to European citizens. From Figure 1 we see that for 
the years marked by the 2008/09 financial crises the percentage stating terrorism is low. This period 
coincided with the delaying of some EU initiatives as well as a period of low citizen trust in the EU.
As this coincides with a relatively calm period with regard to fatalities, we have chosen to perform 
a regression analysis to help determine whether the effect of fatalities and incidents is robust when 
including other explanatory variables. However, there seems to be a clear ‘spillover’ effect, namely 
across national borders and individual member states’ public opinion. This is to say that incidents in 
one EU country result in mobilizing public opinion in other countries.
From both models presented in Table 1 we see that the effect of fatalities on EU citizens’ 
perceptions is robust when controlling for other factors. For each additional terror-related fatality 
the value for EU countries will, on average, increase by around 0.2 on the dependent variable. This is 
also by far the strongest empirical finding. There is also a positive effect of number of incidents. 
However, the substantial effect is much weaker, and it is also less than the effect of both population 
and unemployment. The effect of per capita GDP is positive but not significant at the .05-level. GDP 
growth is both positive and significant, indicating that if the economy is going well more people will 
be concerned with terrorism rather than, for example, financial problems.3 The same reasoning can 
be attributed to the negative effect of unemployment, which is also significant. The higher the 
unemployment, the less concerned people are with terrorism. Lastly, population is positively 
correlated and significant. This is not surprising as the largest EU member states (such as 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain) are also the major targets of large terrorist 
operations.
To sum up, we have presented the development over time of perceptions of terrorism, and we 
have seen that in large parts these are determined by terrorist fatalities. In addition, perceptions of 
terrorism are to a certain degree also dependent on other factors. If the economy of a country is not 
doing well, other issues acquire increased importance. Critical among all factors, the effect of major 
terrorist attacks is so strong and both statistically and substantially significant that it must be 
considered as the main determinant of EU citizens’ fear of terrorism.
Fear of terrorism belongs to what is known as the ‘safety domain’ (Boehnke et al. 2002) and, ipso 
facto, is regarded as a topic of highest political salience. Other important safety domain issues are 
border security and irregular immigration. Perceived threats to national or personal security conse-
quently lead to political contestation and mobilization at the national level. Our analysis accounts for 
this, as it is situated at the country-year level. We have accordingly investigated country-year level 
explanatory variables. At the individual level, variables such as age, gender, education, and number 
of household members also influence a person’s overall fear of terrorism (Brück and Müller 2010).
Political consequences of terror and perceived threat-levels
In this section, we look to investigate the last part of our argument: that as a response to terrorism 
and public perception of terrorism, politicians and bureaucrats are expected to approach this issue to 
a larger degree. Studying the data, both from the terror and threat perceptions, and looking at the 
political consequences in the form of initiatives and measures adopted to combat terrorist threats in 
Europe, it would seem that the period 2015–2016 marks a turning point. An accumulation of several 
high-impact incidents in the largest EU member states (France, Germany, and Belgium) in combina-
tion with the peak of the ‘migratory crisis’, clearly represents a change of pace in the political 
dynamics of the struggle against terrorism in Europe. We see a rise in casualties as well as threat 
perception and an upping in the initiatives launched at the EU-level. Security was gaining salience 
also domestically, when several EU-sceptical law-and-order as well as populist right-wing parties 
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could benefit from a generalized feeling of insecurity and loss of control (Germany, Austria. Hungary, 
Poland, Italy, France, and the UK).
As a response to the threat of terror, which also can be argued to have led to political contesta-
tion, member state’s governments called for decisive anti-terrorism measures at the European level, 
underlining the common challenge posed by this transnational threat. Subsequently, the EU took 
a number of initiatives to supply the means to increase its capacity to effectively combat terrorism. In 
2015, the Commission launched the ‘EU agenda on security’ encompassing a wide range of measures 
in the JHA field marking the establishment of the ‘Security Union’ with Sir Julian King as the first 
Commissioner responsible for this portfolio.4 This new agenda, set by EU heads of state in February 
in an ambitious statement on counterterrorism, identified three areas: 1. ‘ensuring the security of 
citizens’, 2. ‘prevention of radicalization and safeguarding values’, and 3. ‘cooperation with our 
international partners.5 Subsequently, the EU established partnerships with countries in the vicinity, 
i.e. the Western Balkans, North Africa, the Middle-East and Turkey, which prioritize capacity-building 
and cooperation in the areas of terrorism, organized crime and cybercrime as interlinked threats with 
strong cross-border and external dimensions (Cross 2017; Kaunert 20098). In the realm of external 
and development policy, the Commission’s proposal for the 2021–2027 multi-annual financial 
framework has allocated the most significant increases for security, migration control and counter-
terrorism programs (Tsourpas 2019).
Internally, the EU has already put into place a range of legal, practical, and support measures to 
underpin a European area of internal security coupling together EU-level institutions and agencies, 
particularly Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, with member states and their national authorities. The 
Frontex’ mandate and resources have been expanded to include counterterrorism in its border 
security mission. Also, a strategy to combat financing of terrorism and several other flanking 
measures such as legislation on firearms and explosives has been taken.6 More than ever before, 
Figure 4. JHA Council Resolutions with explicit reference to ‘terror’ in Europe. Source: European Commission (2020).
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EU member states are now engaged in sharing increasing levels of terrorism-related information via 
Europol and the Schengen Information System. Finally, in other contexts information-sharing and 
the interoperability of EU databases have been major focus areas, among others via the European 
Counter-Terrorism Centre within Europol and a counterterrorism register within Eurojust.
JHA documents with reference to terrorism
The timeline of terror-related policy-making by the EU executive can be seen in the number of 
Council documents directed at different EU-CT initiatives (Figure 4).
Figure 4 shows the absolute numbers of documents (Resolutions of the EU-JHA Council between 
2004 and 2018), making explicit reference to ‘terror’, ‘terrorism’ (or ‘anti’- and ‘counterterrorism’) in 
Europe. The data has been retrieved from the Council’s own document database and analysed 
sequentially for each year. An initial increase in the frequency of numbers can be detected in the 
aftermath of the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively, pointing to a delayed 
awareness (considering a time lag of 1 year) for the possibility that Europe’s mainland might indeed 
be a target for terrorism.
It should also be mentioned that the Madrid attacks led the European Council to establish the 
post of European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator7 and the London attacks the following year 
led to an increased focus on so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorism. We then see a sharp increase in the 
number of documents in 2011–2012 where ‘terror’ is mentioned. These marked the beginning and 
advancement of the Arab Spring as well as the start of the Syrian rebellion and its violent repression 
by the Assad regime. The intensity decreased over time until a turning point was reached in 2015 
when Europe experienced mass arrivals of refugees (the so-called ‘migration crisis’) and several 
precipitating events, namely the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan, Brussels, Nice and Berlin/ 
Breitscheidtplatz. Viewed together with the data on citizens’ perceptions (Figure 1), the empirics 
would support a correlation between precipitating events and growing political salience. The 
measured trend is even more pronounced if we focus our analysis on the number of mentions, i.e. 
how many times ‘terror’ appears in the documents (Conclusions from JHA Council meetings) over 
the same period of time, as in Table 5, below:
Considering the functioning of the multi-level policy coordination among EU member states, the 
EU-level institutions, and the effect of political, social and economic crises in the EU and neighbour-
ing regions, the paper gauges the extent to which the political ramifications of terrorism affected 
policy making in Europe. It has been argued that the perception of threat creates pressure for the 
centralization of decision-making at the pinnacle of government hierarchies (Dahlström, Peters, and 
Pierre 2011). This has the effect of focusing policy debates on a narrow range of security-related 
issues, decisive for elevating (‘uploading’) the corresponding tasks and responsibilities to the EU- 
level. In the JHA context, but also in the field of the European neighbourhood policy, the heightened 
perception of terror threats resulted in strong pressure to elevate the policy framework’s security 
objectives, especially counterterrorism and border control, above other cooperation measures. The 
above graph (Figure 5) suggests a first real peak after 2012 in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, 
coinciding with the hostilities in Syria (again, taking account of the time lag). There is a second sharp 
rise in 2015 subsequent to several incidents or precipitating events. Another factor also supporting 
the hypothesis might appear to be the year 2012 being the first with a recorded number of terrorist 
attacks in years.8
The prominence of the 2015/16 attacks in Paris, Brussels and Berlin with relatively high numbers 
of casualties9 together with rising figures of arriving refugees contributed to this risk and crisis 
perception, creating a sense of urgency at the various governance levels involved in preference – 
and policy-formation. This, in turn, increased the desire for central steering at the core of the EU’s 
decision-making system (Johansson and Tallberg 2010; Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995).
Evidently, the topic gained in importance in accordance with the rising number of incidents and 
casualties on European territory, indicating the salience of ‘terror’ in the political debate at member- 
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state and EU-level. The peak in the first graph (Figure 1) reflects the large number of terrorist 
incidents in 2015–16 and the subsequent decline a following (taking into account the lag in 
suspected causal connection here). The main difference between Figures 4 and 5 is the relatively 
few mentions after the Madrid-attacks in 2004. A possible explanation is that this incident was seen 
as a one-of-a-kind involving the war against Al-Qaida, and the general sense was that this would not 
become a more general perception of uncertainty. In later years, commencing 2011, the higher 
numbers of mentions of terrorism mirrors an increased level of the perception of threat emanated by 
terrorist attacks.
There are caveats with our analysis that deserves attention. First, one can question whether there 
is a real pressure for responsiveness captured by the Eurobarometer data, as policy is also motivated 
by other institutional interests. Economou and Kollias (2019) state that the effect of terrorist attacks 
are weak, short-lived, and affect only a limited number of policy preferences. This can be seen in 
relation to the tradition of security policy and counterterrorism measures being a core-state policy 
area. Yet, there is a strong correlation between our measures, and we argue that citizen concern 
together with other factor should be regarded as a possible explanation of increased emphasis on EU 
counter-terrorism policy measures.
Conclusion
Having examined empirical evidence from a number of qualitative and quantitative sources, on the 
balance the study supports the hypothesis formulated above. We find that the series of incidents 
resulting in the violent death of persons on European soil have had significant bearing on the 
perceptions of threat, mobilizing the fear of terrorism among the electorate and to some degree also 
the subsequent reactions by the political and administrative elite (anticipating or in response) to 
voters’ verdicts, influencing their concerns and considerations, and finally their decision-making 
Figure 5. Absolute numbers of mentions of ‘terror’ in JHA Council Conclusions. Source: European Commission (2020).
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behaviour. Considering Eurobarometer data, analysing the results of a document study of all JHA 
Council meetings between 2004 and 2018, and following the discussion within the political, expert 
and media context, the paper traces the correlations and establishes a positive regressive link; 
factoring out different intervening variables, our findings in combination with the argument outlined 
in the theory section underpin the hypothesis formulated in the introduction. The data presented 
here delivers convincing support for drawing a causal connection between a series of tragic, 
‘precipitating’ events, and the politicization of terror, and – in prolongation – the emergence of 
a European security governance space.
In detail, the analysis and discussion of the empirical material has produced ample and reasonably 
robust evidence of a strong correlation between terror attacks, threat perception and public opinion, 
and, consequently, the rise of political salience, exercising pressure on politicians and thereby 
contributing to a push for collective securitization and the gradual integration of security governance 
in the EU. Altogether, the increased levels of contestation and salience are believed to have given EU- 
CT policies a stronger strategic priority and a higher level of attention in the executive decision- 
making process at the European level. Considering the evidence presented and given the aforemen-
tioned caveats, one may speak of an incremental ‘executivization’ of EU anti-terrorism measures.
We must, of course, take into account that there are several mechanisms at play when it comes to 
policy formation, and the focus of our paper has been on one of them. The channel in which public 
fear of terrorism can be translated into policy is through the electoral channel. Citizens can either vote 
for parties that raise the importance of counter terrorism measures, or well-informed politicians senses 
public concern and react on this. However, it is important to point out that the EU institutions are also 
concerned with the general security of the Union regardless of public opinion, and that there is also 
a direct link (not channelled through citizen perceptions) from terrorist events to policy. For example, 
the resurgent threat of Al-Qaida in the Arabian peninsula, the expansion of the Islamic State with its 
requirement of foreign fighters from Europe, as well as its inspiration to sympathisers within the 
European Union has constituted a direct and immediate threat against the security of the EU.
Future research in this field needs to focus on the administrative processes, which are at the same 
time enabling as well as resulting from this emerging security governance space, as well as on 
questions of accountability of the increasingly interwoven bureaucratic structures in this crucial area 
of core state powers. By means of document analysis and process – tracing research, this could 
expose some of the underlying mechanisms at the macro- and meso-levels, enabling us to distin-
guish between crucial sub-processes at national and EU-levels regarding both political and bureau-
cratic arenas.
Another line of research should address the question of whether and how aspects that are not at 
the core of traditional security concepts have come into the focus of more recent literature on 
‘human security’ connect to this emerging EU governance space.
Notes
1. For robustness, we have also run the models as pooled OLS and fixed effects, with results similar to those 
presented in Table 1.
2. We use data on fatalities from terror attacks and the number of terrorist incidents in the period 2004–2017 
obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2018). The former includes all victims (including attackers) 
who died as a direct result of a terrorist attack. We have chosen to exclude casualties from the 2016 crash of 
EgyptAir Flight 804 which in the Global Terrorism Database was coded as fatalities in Greece. This flight was from 
Paris on its way to Cairo when it crashed into the Mediterranean Sea killing 66 people.
3. We also found a moderating effect of per capita GDP on fatalities which was significant at the 10% level, showing 




5. De Kerchove, Gilles, ‘What has the European Union done to keep us safe from terror’, Europe’s World, 
17 June 2019.




8. According to data from Europol Te-SaT Report, the following numbers on earlier terror attacks had been 
recorded: 0 in 2011; 3 in 2010; 1 in 2009; 0 in 2008; 4 in 2007; 1 in 2006; cf. European Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report, at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and- 
trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2
9. 2015 was the deadliest year in Europe, with 150 victims of terrorism; followed by 2016 with 135 deaths.
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